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Maurice Bloch 
London School of Economics 
 
Reconciling Social Science and Cognitive Science Notions of 
the “Self”. 
 
WORKING PAPER ONLY 
 
The history of the social sciences and especially that of modern 
anthropology has been dominated by a recurrent controversy 
about what kind of phenomena people are. On the one hand 
there are those who assume that human beings are a 
straightforward matter.  They are beings driven by easily 
understood desires directed towards an empirically obvious 
world. The prototypical examples of such theoreticians are 
Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, or more recently the proponents 
of rational choice theory.  These latter positions have been, 
again and again, criticised by those who have stressed that there 
can be no place in theory for actors who are simply imagined as 
“generic human beings” since people are always the specific 
product of their particular and unique location in the social, the 
historical and the cultural process. Among the writers who have 
made this kind of point are such as Emile Durkheim, Louis 
Dumont, and more recently Michel Foucault and the post-
modernists. 
 
Anthropologists have tended to be on the side of the latter since 
they like to use their knowledge of exotic societies to argue that 
what the others see as “human nature” is merely the western 
person glorified. Such a point is justified but the culturalists 
rarely go on to answer the very difficult questions which would 
follow: how far do they want their argument to go? Is there 
really nothing to be said about the species Homo Sapiens? 
 
The universalists criticise the culturalists by stressing the 
general aspects of such things as human cognitive development 
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but they normally get on with things without having to do more 
than pay lip service to the cultural construction of people. 
 
 
The universalists are often  joined, by implication at least, by 
cognitive scientists such as psychologists and analytic 
philosophers.   This is so sometimes because of an argued 
commitment to the notion of a maximising individual, such as is 
the case for the proponents of the Machiavellian mind, but, more 
often, simply by default.    
 
The back and forth between these two ways of specifying 
human beings is in the end tiresome. The theoretical history of 
the social sciences has repeated itself far too often. We seem 
never to get anywhere since both sides seem to have good 
reason for arguing that the other is wrong without being able to 
then incorporate the aspects of their opponents argument which 
they usually also recognise, but only in passing, as partially 
valid.   
 
The reason for this continual repetition of old controversies is 
due to the ease with which both sides can criticise the other by 
pointing to the unreality of their opponents understanding of 
people.  The culturalists can point to the abstraction of 
disembodied a priori entities such as the rational actor of games 
theory, or the culturally free, history free, creatures of much 
psychology. The universalists can ridicule the equally bodiless 
and mindless creatures of much cultural anthropology where 
people are seen as nothing other than epiphenomena of specific 
places and localities.  
 
 
In this lecture I want to argue that the cause for the endless 
repetition of controversy, in the social sciences at least, comes 
from the inability to consider what we are talking about as a 
natural organism rather than the abstractions of unclear 
ontological status that characterise social science theory. If we 
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focus on the human animal, the product of an evolution which 
has made us a very special being which is not, however, 
ontologically different from other living species, we can begin 
the job of understanding the complex way in which we are 
created simultaneously by our biology, which includes our 
psychology, and by history and culture without getting lost in 
the smoke of battle of the phantasy wars of social science 
theory. 
 
Furthermore, if we do this we can think together with the other 
cognitive sciences and we can explain to them in a more 
convincing way how much they need to seriously take into 
account the social and the cultural. 
 
 
My purpose in this lecture is to change the ground over which 
the old controversies have been fought to a manageable one 
where the different disciplines can meet to engage in a joint, yet 
difficult,  enterprise. 
 
What I concentrate on here is the topic where the apparently 
irresoluble conflict between the universalists and the culturalists 
seems most intense.  This phenomenon is indicated in the social 
and cognitive sciences when terms such as self, the I, agent, 
subject, person, individual, dividuals, identity, etc. are used.  
These terms all involve the attempt to describe what it is to be 
oneself and what is assumed to be the way others are understood 
to be, in this or that place. Indeed, we may already note here, 
that, the problematic distinction between self understanding and 
the representation of others is usually unexamined in most of the 
social science literature as opposed to what is the case in the 
cognitive sciences. 
 
The lumping together of these different terms may well seem to 
be inappropriate, even sloppy, since many social science authors 
take great pain in distinguishing these words and offering 
extremely precise definitions.  The problem, however comes, 
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when we try to put together this massive literature, when, for 
example, we try to relate, Geertz’s discussion of the  Balinese 
“person” (1973), with Dumont’s “individual” (1983) , Mauss’s 
“moi” (1938) and Rosaldo’s “self (1984)1. When I attempt such 
combination I have to admit that I am completely lost and so, 
you will have to excuse me if I refer to this entire indistinct 
galaxy, some part of which, or all of which, these terms seem to 
refer to, simply as the BLOB. This seems particularly justified 
since, in spite of this multiplicity of would-be distinct labels 
much the same claims have been made, whatever word is used.   
 
Foremost among these claims, when made by anthropologists, is 
that the blob is fundamentally culturally and/or historically 
variable. This is what anthropologists mean when they say that 
there is no such thing as human nature, a proposition which 
poses the general epistemological problem of what then we are 
dealing with. If this is so, of course, if the blob is totally 
variable, moulded by history and culture, then it is nothing at all, 
just an arbitrary category of our culture, one that groups under 
various ethnocentric labels things that have nothing essentially 
to do with each other. If so, the blob, under whatever labels it 
masquerades, cannot be a suitable subject for theoretical study. 
 
 
This problem, however, seems not to be taken very seriously by 
anthropologists in spite of their general predilection for radical 
cultural determinism.  When they actually get down to specifics 
we usually find much less ambitious propositions. Thus, in the 
general arguments, it is not usually proposed that there as many 
blobs as there are cultural variations but rather that there are two 
kinds of blobs in the world.  Sometimes this point is expressed 
generally as a contrast between the modern or western blob, on 
the one hand,  and the blob of the rest of mankind, on the other.  
This is, for example, what Durkheim argued in The Division of 
Labour in Society(1893) with his distinction between organic 
and mechanical solidarity.  
                                                 
1  André Beteille expresses the same frustration. ( Beteille 1991:251)   }. 
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Similarly Dumont (1982) stresses the same familiar dualist 
contrast of the individualism of the post reformation West, with 
the holism of the hierarchical rest.  The same dichotomy is also 
found in the work of ethnographers or historians who, although 
they talk about particular places, argue that there, or then, the 
self, the person, the subject, or what have  you, is different from 
what we, in the modern west, have here and/or now.  Thus  
Wood (2008)   argues  that the very notion of self was absent in 
biblical times,  Snell in the Iliad (1953), Marilyn Strathern 
argues that the New Guinea person is quite different to the 
Western one (1988),  Kondo argues this for the Japanese self,  
McKim Marriot for India (1977), Geertz for Bali (1973), etc.  
The west seems simply used as the contrast to the specific 
situations discussed, but, in fact, it turns out that these very 
varied non-western non-modern places are very similar among 
themselves, places where interiority and individuality is 
devalued but where social relationships and group membership 
dominate.  More recently a further twist has been added with 
some writers arguing that in post-modernity we have now 
arrived at a post-blob, post-modern, stage (Ewing 1990, Markus 
and Kitiyama 1991). This addition might be thought to lead to a 
tripartite division with pre blob, blob and post blob but in fact 
the proposed pre-modern blob and the post-modern blob look 
singularly alike in that they are both non-essentialist, distributed, 
contextual and divided.  Anthropological arguments about the 
blob can therefore be summarised as saying there is a great and 
absolute divide between the individualist west and the social 
relational rest. 
 
The basis for such repeated exhortation, that we should not 
assume, as the univeralists do, that what we know as the blob is 
applicable everywhere is real enough. It is a common experience 
of ethnographers who work in very different societies and 
cultural milieus, such as me to go no further, to be struck, and 
indeed even sometimes shocked, by how little value is given to 
individual motivations and how roles and group membership are 
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the main, and often the only expressed, criteria of right conduct.  
This is also reflected in certain non modern, non western legal 
codes such as those on which Mauss based himself in his 
discussion of the concept of the person, or in the implications of 
rituals, such as those discussed by Marilyn Strathern, which she 
uses as the basis of her analysis of the Melanesian dividuals 
(Srathern: 1988).  Such data does seem to produce a view of 
people as merely points in social systems while their internal 
states, their intentions, their absolute individuality and personal 
desires are irrelevant. This dichotomous contrast between the 
west and these “other” societies is often exaggerated 
(Beteille:1991,  Leenhardt  1985 Parry 1989).  However, there 
are very real and important differences between cultures which 
are worth discussing.  Thus, it is not my intention to minimise 
the significance of the cultural as it is argued for in the works I 
have been implicitly or explicitly referring to, but instead to ask 
whether the facts that have been noted have the fundamental 
implications for the “construction” of the blob that so many 
social scientists give it? I shall argue they do not but then, by 
integrating the work of anthropologists with that of cognitive 
scientists, I want to place the anthropological ideas within a 
model that is not antagonistic, but compatible, with what 
cognitive sciences can teach us 
 
Two anthropological writers have already called into question 
the excesses of the relativist position in relation to the blob, 
especially when it goes under the name of “self”. Melford Spiro 
in a devastating critique of authors such as McKim Marriot, 
Geertz and others demonstrates how the evidence used for such 
dramatic generalisations is selective (1993).  As an example, he 
notes that reference to the devaluation of the self in Therevada 
Buddhism is not, as has been suggested, evidence of the absence 
of the notion in a country such as Burma, but rather, of its 
presence.  In a somewhat similar vein Naomi Quinn (2006) 
criticizes recent post-modern writing in anthropology that 
suggests that the idea of the integrated self is outdated and/or 
wrong on the weak and trivial basis of the uncontroversial fact 
 6
that people can hold contradictory ideals.  Her point is that 
explicit reflexive self representation cannot be equated with the 
blob as it is lived and, putting the words in her mouth that I will 
use below, that we must distinguish cognition and meta-
representation, that is re-representations, in these cases public 
re-representations, about cognition (Sperber 2000).  (I am, 
however, much more hesitant than she is, given our present state 
of knowledge, in identifying various aspects of selfhood directly 
with different types of functional or anatomical areas of the 
brain.)  
 
 
Spiro and Quinn make two convincing and important criticism 
of the work of anthropologists: firstly, they are right that 
anthropological writing about the blob is often spectacularly 
imprecise and, secondly, it is true that claims made in this area 
are commonly of very uncertain epistemological status. I also 
support explicitly Quinn’s implicit argument that the attempt at 
naturalising what is being talked about would help clear the fog 
(Quine 1969). 
 
The implication of the critiques by Spiro and Quinn is that 
anthropologists are wrong when they make the absolutist claim 
that the blob is simply a product of history and is totally 
culturally variable. Neither author, however, claim that culture 
and society do not have an influence, but the question how, and 
how far this is so, cannot be advanced until the epistemological 
status of what is claimed is clarified.  Thus, as both Spiro and 
Quinn recognise, it is not that anthropologists are talking about 
nothing in their discussions of self, person, agent, personality, 
identity, but that what it is they are talking about, and how far 
they want to go, cannot be pinned down.  
 
As Spiro and Quinn have done a good job in criticising much 
anthropological writing, this clears the way for a more positive 
attempt at replacing the anthropology within the wider theory 
they implicitly call for. What follows is the attempt to do this. 
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*********** 
 
One major problem in social science writing is the lack of any 
serious attempt to distinguish levels in the phenomena to which 
the blob words seem to refer.  It is true that some 
anthropological writers do make a weak attempt at 
distinguishing levels but these are soon forgotten. Thus Mauss 
begins his essay on the self and/or the person in the following 
way: “I [shall not] speak to you of psychology…it is plain…that 
there has never existed a human being who has not been aware, 
not only of his body, but also, at the same time of his 
individuality, both spiritual and physical, …My subject is 
entirely different…the notion that men in different ages have 
formed of  [the self].” (Mauss 1985: 3).  Yet the essay continues 
as a discussion of his “first subject”. Similarly though the other 
way round, Antze and Lambek state in a book about culture and 
memory that autobiographical memory “and the “self” or 
“subject” mutually imply one another.”  P.xxi.   but we then find 
that they slide away from a discussion of the central issue by 
telling us that “our book is less about memory than about 
“memory”…..That is to say it is about how the very idea of 
memory” comes into play in society and culture…” p.xv  (Antze 
and Lambek: 1996). This is presumably local ethno-
psychological theories about whose value they do not commit 
themselves. Mauss says that he will not talk of psychology but 
does, while Antze and Lambek declare they will but don’t and, 
instead, talk of what I shall call below meta-representations. 
 
Distinguishing levels of the blob is very difficult but essential if 
we are to understand the relation of the blob to culture.  Few 
things have more hindered dialogue between social and 
cognitive sciences than proper consideration of what level we 
are dealing with and of the significance of the relation between 
these levels. 
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What follows is, therefore, a rough attempt at distinguishing 
levels in the natural phenomenon because I believe, this is 
necessary  for understanding how social science, and especially 
anthropological, discussions concerning the blob can be 
integrated with those from the cognitive sciences. Interestingly, 
distinguishing levels also produces a kind of natural history of 
our species in that what I call: the lower levels are characterised 
by features that we may assume are inherited from our very 
remote pre-mammalian ancestors since these are shared with 
other distant living species, while others, here qualified as 
higher, are unique specialisations of our species. The integration 
of anthropological considerations within the wider framework 
outlined here thus also suggests a facilitation of the integration 
of the social science theories within evolutionary theory (Seeley 
and Sturm 2006 p. 321ff.) 
 
This preliminary attempt at distinguishing levels is based on the 
work of a number of scholars in cognitive science who tend to 
use one of the names of the blob: the self. Relying on these 
authors is, however, a tricky enterprise since they are not all in 
agreement either.  Fortunately, for the simple purposes of the 
present exercise, it is possible to by-pass the disagreements by 
concentrating on what most are agreed on.   What is crucial is 
that there indeed are very different levels to the blob, with the 
deepest levels shared by all living things and the highest levels 
creating the possibility of a narrative reflexive autobiography.  It 
is essential, however, to remember that  all the levels one might 
choose to distinguish are simply points in what is a continuum, 
which means that they are all related to each other even though 
some are more directly culturally affected while others are not. 
All those involved in the discussions are agreed that somewhere 
in that progression language and reflexivity, meta-cognition or 
meta-representation, comes into play (e.g. Neisser 1988, 
Damasio 1999).   
 
The list of levels noted below simply “will do” for the purpose 
at hand and will not probably cause relevant problems for my 
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argument although the issues are greatly simplified and the 
terms used very loosely. 
 
First of all we can distinguish a level that has often been labelled 
the “core self”  (Slide 1). Some aspects of this are very general 
indeed. These involve two things 1) a sense of ownership and 
location of one’s body, 2) a sense that one is author of one’s 
own actions (David et al. 2008, Vogeley et al 2003).  This type 
of selfhood must be shared by all animate creatures since, as 
Dennett puts it, even a lobster who relishes claws, must know 
not to eat his own (Dennet1991:429). (I suspect that even the 
most dedicated cultural relativist is unlikely to argue that this 
level varies from one human group to another.) It should be 
noted that the word “sense”, as I have applied it to this level, is 
used here in a particularly thin way, implying no reflexive 
awareness whatsoever. However it must also be stressed that, 
even at this level, we are dealing with quite complex cognition 
as Descartes discussion of phantom limbs long ago emphasised, 
and also as is shown experimentally by more recent 
experiments, such as those with the rubber hand where a subject 
can be made to feel sensations in a model arm (Botvinick and 
Cohen: 1998).  
 
Above this level is one often labelled the “minimal self”.  (Slide 
2) This involves the sense of continuity in time. Many animals 
from crows to chimpanzees have this sense of their own 
continuity and that they, like us, attribute a similar continuity in 
time to their con-specifics (Hauser et al. 1995). This sense of 
continuity in time is essential for the use of any type of longer 
term memory and seems essential for more advanced cognition 
such as the ability of self recognition, demonstrated, for 
example, in recognising one self in a mirror.  Animals such as 
chimpanzees and gorillas can do this.  Interestingly this sense of 
continuity of oneself and others is particularly developed in 
social species. (Emery and Clayton 2004).  Here again, when we 
are dealing with this level, the word sense is used in a thin way. 
It does, however, imply the ability to “time travel” that is to use 
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information about the past for present behaviour which involves 
being in the past in imagination, and the ability to plan future 
behaviour which requires being in the future in imagination.  
Nonetheless, it implies no reflexive awareness of the mental 
state that one is in. It involves the short term memory necessary 
to organise episodes, usually referred to as episodic memory  
(Conway 2001) and it involves the retention of some such 
episodic memories without these being woven into a coherent 
story, at least one which is recoverable in consciousness.   
 
Conscious access requires a higher stage which I call here, 
following a number of authors, “the narrative self” (Dennett 
1992, Humphrey and Dennett 1989) (Slide 3).  In some earlier 
writing autobiographical memory was practically synonymous 
with the self but this is clearly misleading if we remember levels 
such as those indicated by the terms “core self” and “minimal 
self” and so the term “narrative self” was created to both 
maintain and limit the scope of the link.  The narrative self and 
autobiographical memory imply each other (Tulving 1985).  All 
humans create, at least after the age of three or four, such an 
autobiography though it remains an open question whether this 
is also done by other animals (Gallup 1970). The narrative self 
significantly involves reflexive interaction with others so that 
the self can become, in Mead’s words “an object to one’s self in 
virtue of one’s social relation to other individuals” (Mead  
1962:172 cited in Zahavi ND). 
 
Before we go further I want to stress a point to which I shall 
return and which will become central for my argument.  The 
distinction between levels proposed here is not discontinuous 
and these are not fully separable. We are dealing with a 
continuum (SLIDE 4). 
 
A difficult questions about autobiographical memory and the 
narrative self revolve around the questions whether it need be 
conscious, how far it requires language, and how far it can be 
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equated with the stories that people actually tell about 
themselves (Nelson 2003) (Bloch 1998).  
 
Some authors, such as Dennett and Ricoeur (1985), have argued 
that this level necessarily implies consciousness, language and 
the ability to tell stories about oneself, in other words explicitly 
expressed autobiographical memory.  The difficulty with the 
notion of the “narrative self” comes precisely from this lumping 
together of different elements. Does the autobiography of 
autobiographical memory need be conscious or merely 
consciously accessible? Do autobiographical memory and the 
“narrative self” require language and, if not, is there not a non-
linguistic narrative self, to be distinguished from a linguistic 
level? How far are we dealing with cognition or meta-cognition, 
with representations or meta-representations?  In other words is 
having an autobiography the same thing as being aware that one 
has an autobiography? Is talking about one’s autobiographical 
past the same as having and using such an autobiographical 
memory?  A capacity, which, it is most likely, we share with 
non-linguistic anthropoids.  
 
These difficulties have been highlighted by the philosopher 
Galen Strawson in his discussion of the notion of the “narrative 
self” (Strawson 2005).  He argues that within his own culture 
English culture (since like most philosophers it is the only one 
he considers) there are some people who are into creating 
conscious autobiographical narratives about themselves, these 
he calls “diachronics” and others, like himself, who are just not 
interested in doing this. It is not their rhetorical style. He calls 
these latter people, somewhat unfortunately, “episodics”.  
 
Strawson convinces me that one should indeed separate those 
who merely manifest an “episodic self”, which does not involve 
a conscious and explicit expression of the kind of autobiography 
that one would talk about in natural circumstances, from those 
who manifest a  “diachronic” self who have a strong sense of 
having a narrative autobiographical self or an “I that is a mental 
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presence now, was there in the past, and will be there in the 
future” and who, most likely, go on about it (Strawson 
1999:109).  (Slide 5) 
 
Strawson talks of two different types of people but this is so at 
the phenomenological level only.  However, I would argue that, 
in terms  of the constitution of the blob, both lots, in spite of 
different outward behaviour, have a narrative self. Only some 
people, Strawson’s diachronics, have  an extra.  They engage in 
a particular form of activity which involves creating  a meta-
representational diachronic narrative self by talking about their 
feelings, their inner states and their autobiography. 
 
If that is so Strawson is suggesting an answer to the questions 
which often are muddled together. The stories that some people 
tell about themselves or about the nature of selves in their 
cultures are a quite different matter to whether they have a 
narrative self or no.  Everybody has a narrative self.  Some 
people go in for meta-representing this. (Slide 6) Others do not 
or do so much less so, because, as Zahavi puts it “we should no 
make the mistake of confusing the reflective, narrative grasp of 
a life with the pre-reflective experiences that make up that life 
prior to the experiences being organised into a narrative” 
(Zahavi ND).   
 
The difference between Strawson’s two types of people is thus 
much less fundamental than the differences in levels that I have 
been discussing so far. Indeed the fact that diachronics go in for 
meta-representations of themselves may be considered as a quite 
different matter than the constitution of the blob. Explicit 
manifestations are public acts and as such are determined by the 
social and cultural context in which they occur.   Thus, at the 
level of discourse, Strawson’s diachronics and episodics will 
appear very different in that they will sometimes talk about 
different things and possibly sometimes act in different ways but 
this does not mean that they belong to quasi different species, in 
fact the difference is little more than one of rhetorical style. 
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************* 
 
And this is where I return to anthropology.  At the beginning of 
this lecture I recounted how many anthropologists seem to argue 
that there are two different kinds of people in the world. What I 
believe they were talking about was something much less 
fundamental. They are distinguishing between the people who 
Strawson call diachronics and those he calls episodics. This is a 
difference which I rephrase as between these people who have 
got into the habit of talking about their inner states and those 
who don’t.  This is an interesting difference but it does not mean 
that mankind is divided into two quasi species as is implied in 
the works I criticise. A surface difference is taken as a 
difference in substance. What such a mistake leads to is well 
illustrated by Unni Wikan in her criticism of Geertz depiction of 
the Balinese self  (Wikan: 1990). 
 
If we return to Mauss and Antze and Lambek we find that they 
were aware of the distinction between the Blob it self and Meta-
representations of the Blob but in spite of this they slide from 
one topic to another and in fact only talk of meta-representations 
when they wish to talk about the blob. Most anthropologists are 
vaguer and simply talk happily of meta-representations as 
though they were the blob.  
 
In those societies where, for historical/cultural reasons, it is 
acceptable, even encouraged, to talk about internal states of 
mind, individual motivations and autobiography there are many 
diachronics and these will often take centre stage.  It should be 
noted however that, as they do this, they are not exposing their 
selves, their individuality, their personhood, their agency, to the 
harsh light of day.  They are doing something quite different; 
they are telling stories about themselves to others, which should 
not be mistaken for the complex business of being oneself 
among others. What they are doing when they are being 
diachronics, and this is the implicit point of Quinn’s criticism of 
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post modernists, is interpreting those few aspects of their blob 
that are easily available to their consciousness, and then  re-
representing them as best they can, in other words  publically 
meta-representing them.  This makes clear the error of the direct 
“representational” reading that anthropologists have made of 
such meta-representational activity, which has led them to 
consider discourse about the self and others to be what it is a 
representation of. 
 
In societies where, in most contexts, such meta-representational 
talk about one’s internal states and motivations is thought 
inappropriate or even immoral, discourse will obviously not 
normally be psychologically oriented but will be much more 
about the rules of behaviour that should be followed in groups, 
roles, rights and duties and exchange systems. This is my 
experience among the more remote Malagasy groups I have 
studied. 2  Such emphasis does not mean we find there an 
alternative self, different from the self of the west where the 
rhetorical emphasis is on individuality and interiority.  It is 
simply that anthropologists, missing their familiar public meta-
discourse about the blob, when they are in societies where the 
glorifying of diachronics does not take place, therefore 
concentrate on the discourse about relations and morality, 
which, in any case, is found in all societies.  The 
anthropologists, quite misleadingly, make this into a compatible, 
if alternative, blob, a kind of substitute concept of the person, or 
the individual, or the self or the agent, while in fact it is nothing 
of the sort. There is thus no basis for a contrast between two 
types of blob.  
 
This is all the more so as, most likely, we are dealing with a 
statistical difference not a categorical one. If the people of 
modern Britain are, as Strawson argues, divided between 
                                                 
2 Though it is important to note also that such talk about internal 
states can easily be generated as it can in England, thus showing 
that it exists in some contexts.  This I have described in a 
number of recent publications (Bloch 2005). 
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phenomenological diachronics and episodics it is likely that the 
relative proportions are affected by the culture of Britain not 
merely by individual dispositions.  If that is the case, it is also 
likely that in other cultures, these proportions will be different.  
In my experience talk about internal states and individual 
motivations does occur in Malagasy villages, although rarely. 
The individualist, self reflexive blob cultures of the west, are 
merely  those where a lot of people go in a lot for diachronic 
narratives while the “others” are ones where people are rarely 
tempted to go in for meta-representation of their internal 
feelings3.  
 
******* 
 
                                                 
3  
This is particularly important in making us realise the 
fundamental difference in the ways we know others and 
ourselves. We only have empirical access to the blob of others 
through their explicit discourse and outward behaviour. 
Although we may, consciously or unconsciously guess at what 
might lie below, for most practical purposes we don’t need to go 
beyond outward manifestations for interaction and these  are of 
a different character to being  myself and, anyway, greatly 
simplified.  On the other hand, although we may also imagine 
ourselves as seen through the eyes of others, this will only be a 
minor part of our blob, most levels of which, as I have argued 
are below the level of consciousness. 
 
This difference between knowledge of ourselves and others is 
important not just theoretically but also methodologically as it is 
relevant to the way we can use the work of anthropologists in 
the general enterprise in which I am engaged.  Anthropologists 
inevitably can only study others. They are thus tempted to use 
the representations we use when dealing with others as though 
they were simply the “person” in this or that place.  
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I have used Strawson’s distinction between episodics and 
diachronics to show that anthropology’s two kinds of people are 
nothing of the sort.  
 
However, an unfortunate conclusion could be drawn from the 
above. It might appear at this point that what I have argued is 
that meta-representations of the blob are cultural and that the 
blob itself is natural. This might be a modification to their 
theory that some culturalists or universalists might not have too 
much difficulty in accepting. They could then say: let the 
different disciplines get on with their own thing, the 
anthropologist talk about public meta-representations and the 
cognitive scientists talk about the fundamental blob. This would 
be totally misleading.  
 
Cognitive scientists and Social scientists may have been talking 
of different things with the same words but both really do want 
to talk about the blob,  Anthropologist often make clear that they 
desire to say something about the blob itself but are continually 
led astray by the easier accessibility of meta-representations. 
However if we become aware of what is happening, which is 
also the source of the tiresome  repetition of the debate in the 
social sciences, then a framework for a proper joint enterprise 
can be envisaged.  This I attempt to approach schematically in 
the last part of this lecture. 
 
 
********** 
 
First of all it is important to remember the most significant fact 
that the levels of the blob I have distinguished are not separate 
or fully distinct.  There is a continuum from the core self to the 
narrative self (Squire:1992)4. (Slide 4) All levels interact. Thus 
the narrative self is continuous with the primate wide 
requirements of the minimal self and the minimal self is 
                                                 
4 Squire shows that the old distinction between declarative and 
non declarative memory is not neurologically based.}  
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continuous with the living-kind-wide requirements of the core 
self. Similarly the narrative self is continuous with the minimal 
self which will itself be affected by the core self. We are 
psychologically and physically one. 
 
But there is also another aspect to the continuum of the blob. As 
soon as we are moving to the higher levels we are also moving 
from the internal and private level of such factors as the 
awareness of ownership of one’s body and its location; towards 
the public, and therefore inevitably social, expressions of the 
narrative self.  
 
This gradual move from the private to the public and above all 
its internal continuity is particularly important if we are to 
understand how the cultural/historical affects the blob. We 
might be tempted to assume that the private is untouched by the 
cultural while the public, caught up in social discourse, is 
entirely cultural.  This would be misleading because it would 
forget the continuity of the blob through its various levels. The 
blob is a process. It is not a matter of a binary contrast but one 
of more or less. In other words, like icebergs the blob is 90% 
submerged but the exposed part has no real independent 
existence from the submerged part and vice versa. 
 
But to the internal continuity of the blob must be added another 
continuity: that between blobs. This I have not considered so far. 
 
It is by means of the continual exchange between individuals 
that the cultural and, therefore, the historical character of the 
blob comes about.  (Sperber 1985 Dawkins 1976 Dennett 1995  
Tomassello 1999).  
 
Thus the analogy with icebergs can also mislead because, unlike 
icebergs, the exposed parts of the different blobs are not fully 
distinct one from another. They are organically united with each 
other.  We are a social species and, as is the case for other social 
species, the fully isolated Cartesian individual cannot be 
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anything than, what it was for Descartes himself, a thought 
experiment. It is through the continual complex social exchange 
between individuals which characterises our species, that 
history/culture becomes part of the process that is the blob.  This 
is so because this interchange, in the case of humans, is part of a 
process which involves not only the interaction of  presently 
living public parts of blobs but also the indirect inter-creation  of 
the public parts of living blobs with the once public parts of 
dead blobs, in some cases public parts of blobs dead long ago. 
 
The blob is not just situated in this process it is itself moulded 
and modified by it to a significant degree. That the social and 
cultural character to a certain extent creates the blob has been 
stressed again and again in both the social science and the 
cognitive science literature, as it was in the remarks from Mead 
I quoted above.  The social and communicative aspect of 
humans has meant that the boundary between the individual 
organism in a species such as our own is only partial in that we 
go in and out of each others bodies, not only because of the 
physiological processes of birth and sex but also through the 
neuro-psychological processes of the synchronisation of minds 
that occurs in social exchange. This I discussed in earlier paper 
(Bloch 2007) (see also Humphrey (2007). (Slide 6) 
 
This process of inter-penetration and historical creation is of 
course what social scientists and especially social and cultural 
anthropologists have been traditionally emphasising. It is 
essential to any theory of the blob. The exposed parts of 
different blobs are to a varying  extent continuous with each 
other and this is not just at the narrative self levels but also for 
some aspects of lower levels evoked by the term the minimal 
self, since simpler but essential  forms of joint action and 
therefore interchange also exist.  The merging of public parts of 
blobs is never complete since differentiation of one’s blob from 
that of others is as necessary for the social process as is the inter 
penetration of different blobs.  
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This leads me to my very simple conclusion about the blob.  The 
blob is simultaneously caught up in two quite different 
continuities both of which link at either of their poles what are 
essentially alien elements.  One continuum links up, and to a 
certain extent merges, different but nonetheless distinct blobs, 
different people linked by social ties, in other words.  The other 
continuum links the totally sub conscious core blob with the 
potentially re-represented narrative level. As is the case of the 
social link, elements that are ultimately different are partially 
united into a not fully integrated, or integratable, whole.   
 
Thinking of either of these continuities is bad enough but we 
have to think of them together! If we do not, the difficult 
phenomenon we have to try to understand drains away with the 
bath water and we are left with concepts that cannot be related 
to anything in nature. The error of those cognitive scientists that 
such social scientists as Durkheim criticised is that they forgot 
the continuous social historical continuum and thus make the 
mistakes that most first year anthropology students have 
explained to them again and again. We cannot talk of people in 
general without bearing in mind that they have been and are 
being made different to a certain extent by the social process. 
 
Cognitive scientists have recently discussed extensively the 
mechanism which makes the cultural nature of humans possible.  
However, they have not taken on board the obvious implication 
of this. That because of culture there are no purely generic 
humans. The implications of this for research and more 
particularly cross cultural research are dramatic and rarely 
accepted.  It is that whatever empirical work we want to carry 
out demands that we first understand our subjects in their unique 
specificity and not just as fully formed humans who are then 
superficially affected by culture.  
 
The problem of the social scientists is double.  First of all, there 
is the fact that I discussed already.  On the whole, they have 
only looked at meta-representations of the blob and, 
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occasionally, at the narrative level.  This is because this is what 
their research methods made easily available. They then have 
either pretended that these levels were the total blob or they 
have argued that these levels were clearly distinct from other 
levels, thereby implicitly importing the kind of nature/culture 
dichotomy that, in another register, they denounce. 
 
Secondly, when thinking about the blob they have forgotten its 
internal complexity.  This is what I have been stressing here.  
They have forgotten that it seamlessly joins very different types 
of phenomena some of which although inseparable are totally 
unaffected by the mechanisms which they study. 
 
********** 
 
I have tried to reconcile the kind of ideas that have characterised 
anthropological writing on the blob with that which has been 
produced by cognitive science. I have attempted to build a 
model which can include in one model the theoretical points and 
observations that have come from both sides within a system 
where the different factors that have interested social and 
cognitive scientists affect different parts of a single natural 
phenomenon. This is because representations of the human blob 
have to be compatible with the multiplicity of empirically 
inseparable processes within which we exists. All living things 
are caught in two processes phylogeny and ontogeny5. When we 
are dealing with our species we have to add a third process: that 
                                                 
5 Our models must, therefore, talk of living things whose 
specificity, explicitly or implicitly, is comprehensible as the 
product of the process of natural selection. This is done I 
suggested here in that I have suggested something of the 
evolutionary history of the blob.  These living things must be 
able to be produced and develop, grow from single cells to the 
mature phenomena we claim they are.  I have not been able to 
touch on this here but I have used cognitive science literature 
which has begun to explore that side of things extensively. (e.g. 
the studies in Moore and Lemmon: 2001)  
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of history. This I have included and revised in the discussion of 
cultural interaction. We must keep, at least in the back of our 
minds, all three processes otherwise we are forgetting the 
specific nature of the human animal. Instead, we move into a 
hazy land, where nothing can be situated in nature, and where 
mysterious words, such as those which I have merged together 
to create the blob proliferate, without anyone being able to 
explain how they relate to each other. This, of course, is 
inevitable when we are in the never-never land of culture 
without minds and bodies or of minds and bodies without 
culture and history.  
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